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ABSTRACT 
Technological  switching  and  re-switching  has  been  the  subject  of  debates  within  economics.  Under 
assumptions of malleable capital in economies with multiple sectors,  the wage-rent envelope can show 
multiple  re-switching.  The  interest  of  technological  change  and  switching  behavior  for  fisheries 
economists and managers stems from the fact that the control of effective effort remains one of the central 
management problems for that sector, and for many managers, the most elusive. In the fisheries, the 
trawling  technique  has  been  largely  promoted  in  the  seventies  and  eighties.  Consequently,  path-
dependency was developing in such a way that the preferred choice of new entrants into the fishery was 
this technology to produce wild fish. In this context, it can be argued that technological lock-in has 
occurred on the trawling technique, making it the most used technique in the French fisheries sector in 
Atlantic, to the detriment of alternatives, called passive techniques. However, it must be questioned why 
technical switching, from trawling to passive methods, has not been accelerated due to poorer economic 
performance  for  the  former  technology.  This  paper  addresses  the  diffusion  process  of  trawling, 
accompanied by state subsidies. Even if trawling has been commonly defined as a major innovation in 
fisheries, its potential for technological adaptations or minor innovations is questionable when faced with 
an increasing energy price, especially in the absence of State aid. JEL : fishery,  switching, technological 
change, capital 
Keywords: fishery,  switching, technological change, capital 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Many fisheries world-wide are over-exploited mainly because of declining stocks and growing effective 
fishing effort, often helped along by subsidies and jobs programs offered by governments.  Considering 
this unsustainable behaviour by the private and the public sector, economists have every reason to expect 
that their recommendations would be seriously taken; usually a shift towards techniques and practices 
which are more resource conserving, and a systematic control on effort, possibly using market forces.  
There is some global evidence (Sumaila et al., 2008) that this is in fact happening.  However, there are 
also other cases where the practices and the techniques adopted in the past have managed to hang on, 
even though there is mounting evidence that, even from the standpoint of very practical criteria such as 
fuel efficiency, these technologies should be on their way out.  This paper discusses that phenomenon by 
reviewing information on the costs of passive gear versus the production costs of trawls, or mobile gear, 
in  the  French  fishery  and  comparing  that  to  their  exit  and  switching  behavior.    All  countries  have 
examples of unfair and inefficient subsidies, and government-caused technological lock-in.   But we can 
say that the French case demonstrates more clearly than most how an active role by the State may actually 
impede normal processes of technical switching,  thus making the sustainable management of fisheries 
more difficult.   
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There are policies which can encourage sustainable or unsustainable trajectories of technological change.  
An example of this is taken from the French fisheries, where we find evidence that the subsidy policies in 
place for fuel may have comparatively favored mobile gear technologies and large scale fishers.  Over a 
long period of time, the “bending” of the trajectory in this direction by subsidy policies, along with 
passive technology adoption, learning behavior, and the influence from the general economy, exhibits 
inertia that can only be overcome by large exogenous shocks.  In this case, that large shock was the rising 
costs of fuel; but also at issue is whether a fuel subsidy policy in this case really is sustainable. 
 
The paper presents a general overview of the standard neoclassical arguments for re-switching.  Then, the 
empirical evidence of fuel price induced switching from mobile to fixed gears is presented.  Finally, we 
show that the presence of the subsidy policy for fuel would dampen the readjustment to the alternative 
(and seemingly dominant) technical pathway. We conclude the paper by discussing some of the reasons 
why policy makers in France as elsewhere may be motivated to enact these subsidies, even though it is 
generally understood that doing so is neither sustainable nor efficient.  
 
RE-SWITCHING MODELS AND THE MALLEABILITY OF CAPITAL 
Technological switching and re-switching and the conditions under which it happens has been the subject 
of at least three debates within economics, starting with the famous Cambridge debates (see for example 
Han and Shefold, 2006).  These debates arose in part from the divergent views as to the theoretical 
implications of capital, or produced intermediate goods.  Sraffa (1960) predicts that, under assumptions of 
malleable  capital  in  economies  with  multiple  sectors,  the  wage-rent  envelope  can  show  multiple  re-
switching.   
 
The  neoclassical  position is that  despite  its  numerous shortcomings,  being  able to  explain switching 
behavior is not one of them (Stiglitz, 1973).  The process is easily explained as a function of changing 
relative factor prices and marginal productivities subject to underlying changes in technology.   
 
Third and most interesting is the emerging research agenda of evolutionary economics.  These researchers 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988) sought to ground explanations of growth in the micro-behavior of 
the firm.  Technical change was presented as adaptations which are fundamentally evolutionary in nature 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). These are, then, the three related stories about technical switching. 
 
All of them suggest processes which seem to be lodged within the firm and abstracted from the intrusions 
of policy makers in an economy. However, capital is often not fungible, the firm and firm managers are 
not always easily described by the neoclassical representations of technology, and firm managers are 
well-aware that spending resources for coercion and lobbying can at times be a substitute for innovation 
and internal change.   
 
The interest of technological change and switching behavior for fisheries economists and managers stems 
from the fact that the control of effective effort remains one of the central management problems for that 
sector, and for many managers, the most elusive.  It is well-known (Le Floc’h and Fuchs, 2001), that 
technical change in fisheries is largely passive, and may occur for reasons which are related to growth in 
the general economy.   
 
Metcalfe and Steedman (1972) examine the effects of a positive return on capital on the question of 
technique choice.  Using a simple expository model for their analysis, the production of commodities is 
within an input/output framework, where net outputs in the economy are produced using, among other 
factors, capital goods, or goods in process.  It is assumed that a positive rate of profit is earned on the 
value of capital.  Further, they assume an economy in autarky with two homogeneous primary inputs, 
land (L) and labor (l) both of which are fully employed.  In this simple model, these factors are not IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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produced by the economy, and are thus constraints on production.  The simple economy produces two 
commodities, which are both capital goods and goods for final consumption. 
 
To produce the two commodities the economy uses a number of technically efficient fixed coefficient 
processes, all of which are known at the beginning of the process. The production is on an annual cycle. 
All capital stocks are used up and must be replaced at the beginning of each production period. Each 
technique is either land intensive in the production of commodity 1 or labor intensive for commodity 2. 
 
Variations in the consumption patterns of members of the economy and owners of factors are not captured 
in this model.  Aggregate consumption patterns depend only upon relative commodity prices, and perfect 
competition is assumed.  These early authors assumed that the economy in question is in a state of 
stationary  long  term  equilibrium,  and  that  comparisons  between  techniques  are  being  made  in  this 
context.  They add one unorthodox assumption with regard to the perfect competition assumption; that the 
rate of profit on capital goods reflects payments to that factor, and that these values are positive.   Finally, 
a higher ratio of rents to wages does not necessarily lead to using a more labor-intensive technique of 
production, but rather can lead to the use of a more land-intensive technique. 
 
Following  again  Metcalfe  and  Steedman,  the  formalization  of  the  fixed  factor  production  model  of 
commodities 1 and 2, C1 and C2; 
C1 = a11*C1 + a21*C2 + a1*l + A1*L                 (1) 
C2 = a12*C1 + a22*C2 + a2*l + A2*L                   (2) 
Which, with the constraints…  
A1 + A2 = L                      (3) 
a1 + a2 = l                      (4) 
 
forms the basic analytical structure of the problem.  Prices of the commodities in competition are given 
by:  
P1 = (a11*p1 + A21*p2)(1+r) + w*a1 + W*A1            (5) 
P2 = (a12*p1 + A22*p2)(1+r) + w*a2 + W*A2            (6) 
 
The relative prices of the commodities are given by:   
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In other words, the output price ratios of the commodity are a function of the input price ratios, as well as 
r, the payments to capital.  After differentiating this with respect to W/w, and rearranging terms, we 
obtain a linear wage rent frontier, with the additional argument, r. 
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 I is a 2X2 identity matrix and A is the matrix of fixed factor coefficients. 
 
The intuitions of these relations are relatively direct.  Payments to labor in the production of commodity 
two is a decreasing function of those payments made to land and to capital.  When r tends towards 0, the 
relation becomes more simplified still, with values of W2 and w2 attaining maximum values.  This 
theoretical framework is used in Figures 1-2.   
   
Open access fishing, at least in theory, results in payments to capital and labor, but not to land.  If 
resource  rents  do  indeed  dissipate  into  the  economy,  such  a  result  would  imply  that  W=0  for  this IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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economy.  This is an even simpler problem, because it reduces to looking at technique choice as a relation 
between the wage rate for the production in question,  and the payment rate to capital, r.   In these cases,  
the wage-profit frontier suggests switching in a less ambiguous way.  This is shown in Figure 2.  In this 
case the capital intensive technique (a) dominates outside of the range of r1 to r3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Technique choice in the production of commodity 2, assuming open access fishing. 
 
 
Using this simplified model with malleable capital, we explore the impacts of a subsidy favoring the 
capital intensive technique, in this case the trawl technology.  In Figure 3, the situation of no subsidies 
(solid lines) and subsidies (dotted lines) is explored with the framework developed by Metcalfe and 
Steedman.  The dotted lines are the wage-rent frontiers with fuel subsidies for trawls (a) and fixed gear 
(b) compared to the case without subsidies.  If fuel subsidies comparatively favor the capital intensive 
technique (in this case trawling), then the range over which capital intensive techniques dominate will be 
enlarged, even though both techniques benefit from the subsidy.  This is exemplified by the reduction of 
the switching zone where technique b, or the fixed gear, would dominate (from r2-r1 to r1s to r2s).  The 
implications of this are that the malleable capital will be nevertheless fixed within techniques which may 
not be efficient or sustainable.   
 
There are even more complications to this model in real life, however.  Whereas the preceding analysis of 
technical switching assumes malleable capital, the problem in fisheries as in other sectors is that capital 
comes into production and is durable.  The durability of that capital may pose a number of problems to 
the investor, especially in the face of changing costs of other factors.  As will be seen in the case of the 
French fishery and elsewhere, policies of rationalization revealed that the actual residual value of capital 
fixed in the trawl fleet was far lower than the owners of that capital had expected.  Since markets for 
excess capital are not fluid either, we can imagine that there was a strong incitation to younger members 
of the fleet and owners of newer vessels to petition their government for relief.  That relief came in the 
form of subsidies aimed at counter-balancing the high price of fuel.  Such subsidies have the effect of 
pushing the date at which this non-malleable capital is disposed of into the future.  Therefore, it may be 
that technological lock-in may not be just the result of shifting wage-price frontiers, but rather a political-
economic result of producers trying to preserve the values of their capital investments by affecting the 
r
w2 W2
r1
r3
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competitive conditions of factor markets.  A proactive government was enlisted to this end. Therefore, in 
real economic sectors, there may be several techniques operating at once, although one technology may 
be dominant from one time to the next.  In this way, non-malleability of capital may be one reason why 
subsidy programs  seem  persistent.    However,  subsidy programs  help to  ensure  technological  lock-in 
which may not ultimately be sustainable.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Technique choice in the production of commodity 2, assuming open access fishing and 
subsidies. 
 
 
The subsidy therefore has two effects.  It masks or occults techniques which may be more efficient over 
prevailing rates of r and w, thereby slowing down switching.  Second, and more importantly in more 
realistic context,   it helps to fix non-malleable capital onto development pathways for the sector which 
are difficult to change, because of technological lock-in.   
 
The next section presents a case study, and the following section discusses the real-life implications of 
these policies. 
 
FRENCH FISHERIES OF THE ATLANTIC COAST 
 
Depending on the fleet and the year, buyback policies reduced vessel numbers by 44% from 1990 to 
2005. The size of the commercial fishing fleet located on the Atlantic coast has decreased, from 3675 
vessels in 1990 to 2053 in 2005, with a severe drop in 1991 due to the implementation of the first 
decommissioning scheme by the French State to reduce potential fishing capacity.  The largest percentage 
reduction over the period was among vessels using the trawling technique, (46%), whereas the number of 
users of alternative fishing techniques decreased by 43%. The trawl technique represents 40 to 47% of the 
total vessels, depending on the year, and reciprocally, passive methods were used on the greater number 
of fishing vessels.  
 
Measured  from  engine  power  in  kW  (Figure  3),  which  is  directly  related  to  fuel  consumption,  the 
reduction in capacity appears less dramatic for the largest trawlers (-8%), isolated from other segments of 
trawlers, compared  to  smaller  trawlers  under  20  meters  of  length  (-47%). Overall,  decommissioning 
schemes explain a large proportion of the reduction in the size of the fleet, although other motives led 
vessels to exit.  Hence, fleet buyback policies contributed significantly to the reduction in size of these 
fleets.  During the study period, the contribution of the entire fleet of trawlers in terms of kW declined 
from 64% to 60% of the total capacity.  Only the largest trawlers increased their relative capacity (or 
r
w2 W2
r1
r2
r2s
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fishing effort) from 17% in 1990 to 24% in 2005, despite the buyback schemes implemented by the 
French government (Guyader et al. 2007).  
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Figure 3. Evolution of fleets in kW, expressed in percentage, from 1990 to 2005. (Source: IFREMER) 
 
Structural measures to encourage exit from the fishery implemented during the nineties seem to have had 
limited effects on reducing the fishing capacity operated by the larger trawler vessels.   Fishers do not 
respond identically to management measures, such as buyback programs, or other external factors like 
rising fuel costs. If fishermen are assumed to behave rationally, the number of adopters of the trawling 
technique should have been declining in the face of expected high levels of fuel cost, because the trawl 
technique is more energy intensive than passive techniques. For this reason, analyzing fishers’ behavior 
with regard to increasing fuel costs provides new insights into the understanding of technical change, 
especially between trawlers and users of passive fishing gears. 
 
Bookkeeping  databases  provided  landings  value,  operating  and  financial  costs. These  data  cover  the 
1998-2005 period for a constant sample of fishing vessels (trawlers and alternative techniques), classified 
according to length classes, (four classes for trawlers and two for vessels using passive techniques). 
Trawlers  over  20  meters  are  very  sensitive  to  fuel  costs  and  are  considered  in  this  research  as  the 
reference units. For the year 2005, costs and earnings data are available for a constant sample of 180 units 
(Table 1). 
 
We studied fishers’ behavior with regard to the fuel consumption component.  To do this, an econometric 
model was estimated, which represents fisher fuel consumption by fleet class, in the context of increasing 
energy costs.   Fishers’ behavior with regard to increasing fuel costs is dependent on the fishing method 
used.  Moreover, the potential production capacity is constrained by energy requirements.  Length and 
fishing method are assumed to be relevant standards to study the path dependency of each fleet segment 
vis à vis fuel consumption.  The aims of the econometric work was then to measure the gaps between fleet 
classes and the larger trawlers of 20-25 meters, assuming these are more dependent on the energy input.  
 
Stepwise regression methods were used to select the model. The choice criterion is based on Akaike and 
Bayesian information criteria (Greene 2003). We explain fuel consumption in quantity (litres), expressed 
in log (log (fuelt)),  as a function of gross revenue computed one and two years before (log(GRt-1) and 
log(GRt-2)), technical characteristics (deviation from average gross tonnage, GT, and engine power, kW, 
building  year,  and  dummy  variables  for  fleet  segments  with  “trawlers  <12  m”  =1  and  0  otherwise, IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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“trawlers 12–16 m” =1 and 0 otherwise,  “trawlers 16–20 m” =1 and 0 otherwise, “passive <12 m” =1 and 
0 otherwise, “passive >12 m” =1 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 1. Technical characteristics of the French commercial fleet of the Atlantic coast in 2005. Mean 
values of the population and variation coefficients in brackets are given for the age (years), length (metric 
meters), engine power (kW). (Source: IFREMER-SIH and Observatoire économique régional des pêches) 
 
Constant 
Samples 
Number of 
vessels in the 
population (in 
2005) 
Size of 
samples 
(2005) 
Age in 
2005 
(years) 
Length 
(meters) 
Engine 
power 
(kW) 
<12m.  371  27  26 
(39%) 
10 
(14%) 
101 
(37%) 
12-16m.  140  39  20 
(38%) 
14 
(9%) 
229 
(24%) 
16-20m.  125  21  20 
(31%) 
18 
(8%) 
321 
(19%) 
 
 
 
Trawlers 
>20m.  176  34  17 
(33%) 
22 
(7%) 
405 
(17%) 
<12m.  1100  49  21 
(50%) 
8 
(24%) 
76 
(66%) 
 
Passive 
>12m.  140  10  19 
(51%) 
17 
(23%) 
265 
(39%) 
All vessels  2053  180  21 
(46%) 
11 
(45%) 
147 
(84%) 
 
The segment of “trawlers 20-25 m” as the reference segment is in the intercept. Stepwise methods were 
used to test the full model for six years (from 2000 to 2005). The best model, expressed through a semi-
logarithmic equation, includes the explanatory variable gross revenue one year before ( 1 - t GR ) in log, 
deviation from kW and all dummy variables (Equ.9): 
e l l l
l l g b a
+ > + < + - +
- + < + + + = -
m Passive m Passive m trawlers
m trawlers m trawlers d GR Fuel kW t t
12 12 20 16
16 12 12 ) log( ) log(
5 4 3
2 1 1       (9) 
 
As  the  model  associates  explanatory  variables  expressed  in  log  ( 1 - t GR )  and  others  in  linear  form 
(deviation from kW and dummies), we are cautious in the interpretation of the semi-logarithmic equation 
results.  Hence,b is an elasticity coefficient of  t Fuel  with respect to  1 - t GR , as the percentage change in 
t Fuel for a percentage change in  1 - t GR . One can expect a positive coefficient, meaning an increase in 
fuel consumption when gross revenue has progressed the year before. Concerning linear variables, their 
coefficients  ( 5 4 3 2 1 , , , , , l l l l l g )  give  the  instantaneous  growth  rate  and  are  not  directly  elasticity 
coefficients as b .1   
                                                 
1 Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) suggest taking the antilog of the linear coefficients and subtracting the value of 1 
from them to obtain elasticity measures.   IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Fishers in this study have had their fuel costs affected in three ways.  First, fuel costs have experienced 
temporal fluctuations related to world demand and supply.  Secondly, fuel costs confronted by fishers are 
lower, because of their tax exemption.  Third, fuel costs have been affected by emergency measures 
resulting from the fishermen lobbies.  The evolution of monthly fuel prices (Figure 4) excluding taxes 
shows two peaks occurring in 2000 (€0.31 per litre for the fishing fuel price) and in 2005 (€0.40 per litre).   
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Figure 4 Monthly tax exempt fuel price per litre for the French fishing sector, in current Euros, from 1994 
to 2005. (Source: Coopérative Maritime du Pays Bigouden) 
 
Rising fuel prices could have enhanced the substitution effect between fishing techniques in 2000 and 
more particularly in 2005 due to the higher dependence of trawlers on fuel compared to boats using 
passive techniques.  If taxes were to be included, reflecting what a typical consumer in France would pay 
for fuel, then prices would be two or three times higher than shown. Therefore fuel prices paid by the 
fishing as well as the agricultural sectors in France are already subsidized, and have been throughout this 
study.  In addition, the French government has also implemented state aid programs as a result of pressure 
from fishermen’s lobbies.   This double scheme of subsidies is therefore composed of more standard 
measures and the emergency measures put in place in 2000, as well as more recently in 2005 and 2006.   
 
During the study period, from 1998 to 2005, nominal fuel prices increased by 10% a year. However, these 
prices already account for a fuel subsidy.  Fuel cost as a percentage of turnover or gross revenues, 
increased from 16% in 2004 to 23% in 2005 for the trawlers (Observatoire Economique regional des 
Pêches de Bretagne, 2006). However, if we consider emergency state aid as well, the effect of that price 
increase was largely neutralized (17% in 2005).   The impact on passive gears was less severe, ranging 
from 5% in 2004 to 8% in 2005.  With emergency state aid, these costs too were largely neutralized (6%).  
However, the technology that benefits most, not only from tax exemptions but also emergency aid, is the 
trawl technology2.   
 
A permanent increase in fuel price might change fishers’ behavior by reducing fishing time (Ward et al., 
2005) or inducing a technique switching. In the short term, however, fishers did not change their fuel 
consumption.  The results derived from the econometric model confirm this. 
 
                                                 
2 This is because the governance system in the French fishery treats the larger (20-24 meters) trawlers as the “white 
mice”.  When a fuel crisis occurs, the impacts on this segment are measured carefully. During the 2005 fuel crisis, 
the break-even for trawlers ran between 0.3-0.4 Euro/liter, whereas the break-even for passive technologies on 
vessels under 12 meters was estimated at 2.18 Euro/liter (Van Marlen, 2009). 
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The best model, selected with a stepwise method, includes gross revenue (grt-1) the year before, deviation 
from  kW,  and  dummy  variables  (Table  2).  All  variables,  apart  from  the  intercept  and  the  dummy 
“trawlers16–20 m”, are significant at a 1% level. That means that there is different behavior in terms of 
fuel consumption between the largest trawlers (over 16 meters) and other segments of the fleet.  The 16-
20 meter trawlers serve as the reference segment (trawlers of 20-25 meters), particularly from 2003, since 
the dummy variables are insignificant. 
 
Table 2. Results of the econometric model (dependent variable; log of fuel consumption). ***Significant 
at a 1% level, **Significant at a 5% level, *Significant at a 10% level. 
  Year  
2000 
Year  
2001 
Year  
2002 
Year  
2003 
Year  
2004 
Year  
2005 
R
2  0.94  0.94  0.94  0.94  0.93  0.88 
n  178  179  188  180  184  180 
Intercept  0.77  1.43  -0.95  -0.69  -0.13  -1.76 
t-value  (0.9)  (1.7)  (1.1)  (0.8)  (0.1)  (-1.1) 
log(grt-1)  0.98***  0.86***  0.89***  0.91***  0.95***  1.09*** 
t-value  (14.1)  (13.8)  (13.8)  (14.8)  (13.0)  (10.9) 
Dev(ekw)  0.61***  0.61***  0.57***  0.57***  0.44***  0.53*** 
t-value  (7.2)  (7.5)  (6.9)  (7.1)  (4.7)  (4.1) 
Trawlers16-20m  -0.17*  -0.18*  -0.19**  -0.15  -0.09  -0.04 
t-value  (-1.7)  (-1.8)  (-1.9)  (-1.5)  (-0.8)  (-0.2) 
Trawlers12-16m  -0.53***  -0.50***  -0.54***  -0.48***  -0.43***  -0.51*** 
t-value  (-5.2)  (-5.0)  (-5.5)  (-4.9)  (-3.7)  (-3.3) 
Trawlers<12m  -1.35***  -1.28***  -1.28***  -1.26***  -1.16***  -1.15*** 
t-value  (-9.2)  (-9.2)  (-8.9)  (-8.9)  (-6.9)  (-5.3) 
Passive >12m  -1.43***  -1.25***  -1.33***  -1.31***  -1.33***  -1.11*** 
t-value  (-10.3)  (-9.3)  (-9.9)  (-9.9)  (-8.4)  (-5.3) 
Passive <12m  -1.62***  -1.69***  -1.76***  -1.68***  -1.49***  -1.40*** 
t-value  (-10.9)  (-12.0)  (-12.5)  (-12.2)  (-8.9)  (-6.2) 
 
Expressed  in  logarithms,  the  influence  of  gross  revenue  is  positive  and  proportional  to  the  fuel 
consumption the year after.  An increase of 10% in gross revenue, or landings value, leads to a higher fuel 
consumption of between 9%-11% the following year.  As expected, fuel needs are lower for smaller 
trawlers  and  passive  units.    In  this  sense,  the  hierarchy  according  to  fishing  gears  (trawling  versus 
passive) and potential production capacity (length segments) is well ordered. 
 
We do see that trawlers were negatively affected by higher oil prices due to their dependence on fuel 
consumption.  Fleet contribution to total earnings could then be reassessed in the future if the technical 
change from trawling technology to fishing passive techniques is confirmed. The impact of fuel costs on 
the  comparative  desirability  of  alternative  technological  trajectories  should  be  considered  when 
evaluating policy choices.  In the current economic situation however, one could ask why a switching 
phenomena has not been more apparent or accelerated away from trawling techniques, which are more 
capital and energy intensive, especially compared to passive methods, even with all the subsidies. The 
reason why technical change has not really affected the biggest units is because subsidy policies for fuel 
comparatively favor trawling technologies and large scale fishers.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our analysis shows that fuel support regimes could delay the technical change process by slowing down 
the exit of vessels or encouraging them to keep fishing with trawl gear. However, it is likely that trends in IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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the fuel market will be similar to those observed in 2005 (Brook et al. 2004).  If this is the case, another 
fuel price crisis will again raise challenges for the bigger trawlers, which will likely incite vessel owners 
to lobby harder for more aid. In situations where a “political-economic” solution is not possible, the 
economic viability of trawling would decline, leading to switching.  However, that assumes economic 
processes that are not affected by coercive political action by interest groups and proactive governments.   
The French government is proactive, especially as it concerns agricultural producers and fishers (Mesnil, 
2008). So persuasive are these particular pressure groups in France that they have even caused their 
administrations to adopt policies that appear to be at odds with EU policy.   
 
Fishers in this particular case took an early interest in upholding a special regime designed to limit the 
impact of high fuel prices.  The fund as originally conceived was to have been a type of insurance 
partnership, where fishers were to make contributions to a common fund that would have paid out during 
periods of high fuel prices.  This tool has been used in dealing with other risky markets.  However, the 
scheme  was  ultimately  prone  to  market  failure.    The  financial  contributions  from  fishermen  were 
relatively low, compared to the compensation that was ultimately given to stakeholders.  The French 
government then stepped in, and has been the main contributor to this fund, which was originally created 
by fishermen.   In a sense, fishers have forced the French government to protect them, even though that 
same government knows very well that their policy is neither sustainable nor is it likely to be upheld as 
legal. In this case, there is a financial side to the question, since state aid is not permitted to support such a 
compensation mechanism (European Commission 2006).    
 
In cases like this, the State encourages technological lock-in through ad hoc policymaking, often, as 
Olson (1965) has argued, in favour of a small, well-organized group who has a lot to lose or gain.  In this 
case, that group is represented by the more capital intensive technique, which is not necessarily the most 
profitable. This option can be socially sustainable as long as other fishermen using alternative techniques 
also  benefit  from  subsidies.    It  also  requires  that  the  larger  public,  often  unaware  of  the  policy  or 
unconcerned about it, are willing to tacitly or overtly accept the inequities that might occur with the 
policy. However, the more serious problem with ad hoc policy-making is that an artificially induced 
technological  lock-in  is  provoked,  which  can  be  non-sustainable  in  the  long  run  (ecologically  and 
economically).  In this case, the trawling technique should by this time have been an inferior technique 
because it wastes economic resources.  Also at issue is whether fuel subsidy policies to any sector can be 
justified, given what is known about the broader effects of fossil fuel use. There might be justifiable 
cases, but we suspect that they will not be wide-spread. And if they are not, then our discussions about 
capital  non-malleability  and  the  relation  that  has  with  technological  trajectories  highlights  a  crucial 
question:  “…how can new lock-ins of inefficient or undesired technologies be avoided?” (Van den 
Bergh, 2007). 
One way of avoiding or minimizing these effects might be for fisheries economists to explore more 
broadly the literature in economics, especially relating to theories of collective action, public choice, and 
evolutionary economics (Wilson, 2007), and then to build these into our policy recommendations. The 
development of fisheries governance structures that take account of both the positive effects, as well as 
the  negative  effects,  of  coercion  and  lobbying  needs  critical  attention  as  well  as  the  question  of 
technological  trajectory.  Certainly,  changes  in  governance  that  force  discussions  of  policies  through 
public hearings assisted by the press cannot hurt. On the other hand, government assistance in the areas of 
promoting  education  and  entrepreneurial  innovation  among  fishers  that  is  necessary  for  new  and 
sustainable technologies should be favored.   
More  generally  and  over  a  longer  time  period,  public  agencies  everywhere  played  a  major  role  in 
promoting technological lock-in on the trawling technology from the beginning of the 1960’s, which 
turned out to be highly fuel-dependent compared to passive gears. Trawling has often been cited as a 
major innovation in fisheries (Standal, 2007; Meuriot, 1986; Whitmarsh, 1978). However, its potential for 
technological adaptations or even minor innovations is now doubtful without State aid, especially during 
periods of increasing energy prices.  IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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This paper showed evidence of the relative technical disadvantage of the trawling technology for certain 
segments of the French fleet in analyses of fleet rationalization statistics.   But the paper also showed how 
direct subsidies provided to fishermen by the French State, in order to offset increasing fuel prices, may 
have caused resistance either to their exit or to technical change in the sector. Such a system has resulted 
in  increased  usage  of  energy  by  larger  high-powered  vessels,  because  the  State  aid  had  effectively 
reduced operating costs, thus indirectly off-setting increased fuel prices paid by fishermen. In these cases, 
policies  of  this  type  may  well  subvert  other  important  policies  aimed  at  sustainability  and  fleet 
rationalization.   
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